All That Xi Wants: China's Communist Party is Trying to Reform the Country from the Top Down by Berger, Bernt
www.ssoar.info
All That Xi Wants: China's Communist Party is
Trying to Reform the Country from the Top Down
Berger, Bernt
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Berger, B. (2018). All That Xi Wants: China's Communist Party is Trying to Reform the Country from the Top Down.
(DGAP-Standpunkt, 5). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-56259-4
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
All That Xi Wants
China’s Communist Party is Trying to  
Reform the Country from the Top Down
 Bernt Berger 
The Chinese Communist Party’s leadership move to drop the constitutional limits ending 
President Xi Jinping’s tenure after two terms have been interpreted as a long-term power 
grab by many international media. This view however misses a crucial point: Seen 
in conjunction with the Central Committee’s parallel decision to elevate the National 
Supervision commission, the leadership’s step appears in a different light: It seems, the 
Central Committee is finally biting the bullet and embarks on reforms to consolidate the 
government – from the top down. How they want to control the message and also ensure 
co-operation by key stakeholders in this process, remains unclear.
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
has cleared the way for President Xi Jinping to stay in 
office beyond the current constitutional limits, raising 
concerns abroad. However, inside China the move ap-
pears differently: The party is setting the stage for social 
and economic reform.
During the Second Plenary Session of the 19th Commu-
nist Party of China’s (CPC) Central Committee on January 
18-19, the CPC approved an important amendment to Chi-
na’s constitution. The centerpiece was a crucial change 
to Section II, Article 79: the law, which has restricted the 
president to two consecutive terms in office or a total of 
10 years, will be invalidated, pending the assent of the 13th 
National People’s Congress in March 2018.
However, another initiative is receiving less attention, 
but may ultimately prove more significant: the constitu-
tional authorization of the National Supervision Com-
mission (NSC) as an organ that transcends the legislative 
and judiciary bodies. This step will not only herald a high 
degree of recentralization in China – it indicates how 
the Chinese leadership intends to push through overdue 
reforms and overcome inefficient governance structures 
along the way.
After the announcement of the constitutional changes 
in mid-February, Chinese media were quick in stating 
that Xi Jinping would not seek to remain president for 
life. Rather, these steps would provide him with adequate 
time to ensure that the next batch of reforms (2020-35), 
which have been described as “socialist modernization”, 
will be implemented consistently. After all, President Xi’s 
leadership has already lost valuable time: It was only at 
the 13th Party Congress in 2017 that he consolidated his 
own position as the party leader. As pressure for reform 
has become impossible to ignore , the central leadership 
has opted to improve governance at all levels.
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Urgent: Economic reform and effective 
governance 
So far, Xi Jinping’s plan has been going according to 
his schedule. During his first five years in office he has 
eliminated informal yet influential power structures, 
particularly in the public security sector, ousted political 
opponents inside the party, and elevated his own profile 
in Chinese society. Yet important tasks had to be post-
poned from the outset, and the need for economic reform 
and effective governance is only increasing.
Over the past decade, key structural reforms that 
would enable a shift from a rapid economic growth model 
towards a more socially, macro-economically, and envi-
ronmentally sustainable model were put on hold. Prime 
Minister Li Keqiang’s Blueprint for Economic Reform was 
presented in the government’s work report to the 2nd 
Plenary Session of the 12th National People’s Congress in 
2014, but has yet to be implemented. During the 19th Party 
Congress in 2017 the economic blueprint was reissued, 
in part because current economic pressures rendered it 
urgent. 
In recent years, China’s economic growth model has 
in part begun to sort itself out. Rising income levels are 
moving low-skill industries outside of the country. The 
unemployment rate has leveled off at 4 percent. But 15 
million new jobs need to be created each year, and the 
construction sector, one of China’s key drivers of eco-
nomic growth, has slowed down in the face of increased 
housing market regulation and decreasing demand. 
China also remains dependent on foreign investment. 
It is only with the help of government-directed lending 
that the country could maintain economic growth at 
about 6.9 percent in 2017. According to a 2017 IMF state-
ment, the national debt levels remain a major stability 
risk, and current corporate debt has reached 165 percent 
of GDP. In light of these trends, swift action and hard 
choices are necessary.
In order to carry out the economic transition and 
manage its social consequences, the Chinese government 
needs reliable and efficient institutional structures. But 
more often than not, these structures are hobbled by 
institutional conflict. Inefficient officials at all levels have 
left problems unresolved, and bottom-up communication 
has been difficult to achieve. These issues – and the coun-
try’s perennial corruption problems—have done lasting 
harm to the public legitimacy of the CPC. 
It seems that the leadership has bitten the bullet, and is 
now banking on authoritarian consolidation of its govern-
ment system to support its centrally guided reform plans. 
Leading from the Center
Since most of the current challenges stem from miscon-
duct inside the Communist Party (CPC) and an outdated 
economic model, Xi Jinping’s government is working 
from a weak position: He can do little but take pragmatic 
policy steps as the opportunities arise and generally help 
the party manage the pressure. The government’s strat-
egy relies on maintaining control of both the party and 
the Chinese public to make any reform process as friction-
less as possible.
The suggested amendment to Chapter 3 of the constitu-
tion will provide the NSC with the same status as the Chi-
nese State Council and military commissions, and make it 
a powerful instrument to oversee the country’s anti-graft 
measures. The NSC will share responsibility and orga-
nizational structures with the already powerful Central 
Commission of Discipline Commission (CCDC), and will 
oversee local commissions and monitor managers as well 
as state and public-sector employees. In theory, the move 
was meant to improve the party’s self-control, enabling it 
to fight corruption and thus improve public sector perfor-
mance. However, the organ will most likely also be a tool 
for singling out public servants who delay or oppose the 
implementation of reform initiatives themselves.
At the same time, the party has strengthened its grip 
on Chinese society and public surveillance in recent years. 
Although there are plans in place to mitigate the expected 
hardship – it will be a massive shift, with the country 
moving away from the low-cost, low-skill, polluting 
industries that have been the backbone of its growth—a 
large number of the labor force will nevertheless be left 
behind. Due to this expected destabilization, the Chinese 
leadership is recentralizing to ensure that it remains in 
the driver seat.
Key stakeholders are not on board – yet As much as the 
current changes in the center make sense in light of the 
CPC’s internal logic, the implementation of a centrally 
steered reform process raises many questions. The key 
issue is how the self-control mechanisms of the CPC and 
its institutions can be more effective. In the past, informa-
tion inside both the party and the national institutions 
often became distorted as it moved up the ranks. Even a 
more powerful and legally independent supervisory body 
would rely on reliable input about any hold-ups in the 
system.
Closer cooperation with civil society, including unions 
and social associations, might be a more effective way to 
spread awareness of unresolved conflicts and obstacles. 
However, despite statements to the contrary, the CPC’s 
relationship with civil society has been ambiguous and 
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often tainted by mistrust. Meanwhile, the educated elites 
have also lost steam; until a major crackdown on civil 
freedoms began in the wake of the 2008 Olympic Games, 
they had been working to change Chinese politics. It is 
these cohorts in particular that would be helpful now, 
yet they seem especially distraught by the current push 
towards even greater centralization.
Likewise, institutionalized reporting channels, such as 
the gradually improving petition system and the govern-
ment’s online services, still lack the trust necessary to 
function efficiently. In the past, petitioners who handed 
in grievances or complaints regarding their local govern-
ments were exposed to despotism and persecution. The 
CPC needs to square the circle and promote a level of 
confidence in the efficiency of SPC self-supervision that 
will convince people to work with its initiative to make 
governance more efficient at all levels.
Just A Chinese Affair?
From an international perspective, President Xi’s grip 
on power and his push for central control might create 
greater uncertainties about China’s internal reforms, the 
stability of its market, and potentially even its adherence 
to international norms. And the government will have 
even more work to do when it begins cutting back on reg-
ulations – particularly in the finance sector – improving 
intellectual property rights, promoting the private sector, 
curbing monopolies, and making macroeconomic regula-
tions more flexible under a centralist reform approach. 
These are areas which have international repercussions, 
for instance, for trading partners, Chinese business in-
volvements globally and the balance of competition with 
other economies: Outside observers will likely follow 
these developments closely.
As the Chinese government is forced to make hard 
choices, there will be more social grievances; the govern-
ment will likely try to eliminate these additional distur-
bances and cut off international criticism. The resulting 
conflicts will dominate the public debate for years to 
come and impact China’s international image and ties. At 
the same time, if successful, improved governance struc-
tures might indeed improve China’s international status 
as an economic partner, and in the mid- to long-run even 
stabilize the country and even improve the civil rights 
situation. 
Bernt Berger joined the DGAP as a senior fellow in July 
2017 and is responsible for the research institute’s Asia 
research program.
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The opinions expressed in this publication are  
those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the German Council on 
Foreign Relations (DGAP). . 
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